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MILITARY LAW
Design Defects in Equipment: When Are Government






Argued October 13, 1987
Military contractors do a substantial business with the
United States government. On occasion, the equipment
that they provide malfunctions and injures military per-
sonnel. In recent years, there have been a number of
efforts to hold military contractors liable for these inju-
ries.
State tort principles of negligence or strict liability
usually govern manufacturers' liability for personal inju-
ries. Proposals for a federal products liability statute that
would preempt state tort law have not been adopted by
Congress. Although there is no directly applicable fed-
eral statute, when personal injury actions involve mili-
tary contractors, equipment and personnel, federal
courts often adopt a "military contractor defense" that
significantly restricts the liability of a military contractor.
This case gives the Supreme Court an opportunity to
decide whether the liability of a military contractor to
military personnel injured because of defectively de-
signed equipment is limited by a fedL; al, military con-
tractor defense. It poses fundamental questions about
federal courts' authority to fashion a federal common
law. It also poses a troublesome set of policy and factual
issues that must be resolved if a military contractor de-
fense is to be recognized by the Court.
ISSUES
The parties have framed a number of issues for the
Supreme Court. Two are of major concern to military
contractors and military personnel who may be injured
due to design defects in military equipment:
I. In a diversity case, should the liability of military
contractors for injuries to military personnel be based
entirely on varying state tort principles, or should it
be limited by a uniform military contractor defense
prescribed by the Supreme Court?
Emily Calhoun is an Associate Professor of Law at the Univer-
sity of Colorado School of Law, Campus Box 27, University of
Colorado, Boulder, CO 80309; telephone (303) 492-6208.
2. If liability is limited by a military contractor defense,
what is the appropriate scope of that defense?
FACTS
In 1983, Marine Lieutenant David Boyle was co-pilot
of a helicopter in a military training exercise off the
coast of Virginia. The helicopter had been designed by
Sikorsky Aircraft, a division of United Technologies
Corporation (UTC/Sikorsky), as a transport for military
equipment and personnel in amphibious assault opera-
tions. During an attempted landing, the helicopter
crashed in the Atlantic Ocean. Lieutenant Boyle, along
with all others in the helicopter, survived the crash.
Unlike the others, however, he did not escape from the
sinking helicopter. Evidence showed that his death was
due to drowning.
Delbert Boyle, Lieutenant Boyle's father, sued UTC/
Sikorsky for damages arising out of his son's death.
Boyle alleged that UTC/Sikorsky had negligently intro-
duced a metal chip into the helicopter's power steering
mechanism which had caused the helicopter to crash.
He also contended that the system that was to permit an
override of a malfunctioning control mechanism was
defectively designed. Finally, he argued that the co-pi-
lot's escape hatch was defectively designed, because it
would not open when subjected to external water pres-
sure and because another piece of equipment blocked
access to the escape hatch.
Boyle and UTC/Sikorsky introduced conflicting evi-
dence on the source of the metal chip and whether the
chip had caused the helicopter to crash. They also of-
fered conflicting views of the relative responsibilities of
the Na!y and UTC/Sikorsky for design defects in the
helicopter. The initiation of the Navy-UTC/Sikorsky
relationship, in which UTC/Sikorsky responded to a
request to submit a basic helicopter design that would
ensure compliance with Navy performance standards,
was not in dispute. There was, however, disagreement
on the extent of subsequent collaboration, the Navy's
control over the specifics of the helicopter's design and
the Navy's reliance on UTC/Sikorsky's expertise to iden-
tify and warn of potential design deficiencies.
The trial court instructed the jury that UTC/Si-
korsky, as a military contractor, could not be held liable
for a design failure if the Navy had established or ap-
proved specifications for the escape hatch, the heli-
copter conformed to the specifications and the Navy
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knew as much or more than UTC/Sikorsky about the
helicopter's hazards. The jury returned a general ver-
dict of $725,000 for Boyle.
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit over-
turned the verdict (792 F. 2d 413 (1986)). It determined
that there was insufficient evidence to support Boyle's
argument that UTC/Sikorsky was responsible for the
initial crash of the helicopter. It also concluded, apply-
ing a slightly revised version of the trial court's military
contractor defense, that UTC/Sikorsky should not be
held liable for a design defect in the co-pilot's escape
system.
BACKGROUND AND SIGNIFICANCE
Military personnel injured by defective military
equipment have limited options for securing compensa-
tion for their injuries. The United States cannot be sued
in most instances. Although Congress has adopted a no-
fault Veterans' Benefits Act for military personnel, com-
pensation under the Act is limited. The only source of
potentially substantial compensation is the military con-
tractor responsible for producing the defective equip-
ment.
Under these circumstances, it is not surprising that
military contractors are increasingly named as de-
fendants in lawsuits filed on behalf of military personnel
injured by allegedly defective equipment. More surpris-
ing is the occasional application, in these lawsuits, of
what appears to be a federal common law defense that
limits the liability of the military contractor.
Ordinarily, product designers and manufacturers
are liable for personal injuries by virtue of state tort
principles. There is no federal product liability statute to
preempt state law, and it is conventional constitutional
wisdom that there is no general federal common law of
torts. Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction,
and in many instances, as in Boyle, they are involved in
adjudicating military contractor-personnel disputes only
because the opposing parties are citizens of different
states. In the absence of a federal statute that preempts
state law, they must ordinarily rely on state law to resolve
disputes between private parties.
Given conventional constitutional premises, it is curi-
ous that so little attention has been given, in Boyle, to the
application of what is apparently a federal common law
defense. There are well-established federal limitations
on the liability of the United States to injured serv-
iceman, but the Supreme Court has not yat i.cognized
federal limitations on state product liability actions.
Some lower federal courts have justified their use of
a federal common law defense in state produtt liability
actions against military contractors by pointing to the
unique federal interests involved in the lawsuits. These
interests arguably include: the relationship between the
United States government and its military contractors, a
relatibnship that may be adversely affected by state
product liability principles; the federal purse, which also
may be adversely affected by contractor liability; the
constitutional authority given to the federal government
to defend and protect the United States, an authority
that may be undermined by contractor liability; and the
constitutional principle of separation of powers, a prin-
ciple that may be threatened if the judiciary begins to
second-guess military decisions about the design of mili-
tary equipment.
Although these federal interests may sometimes war-
rant creation of federal common law, especially if the
United States is a named party or is directly affected by a
lawsuit, the Supreme Court may view the interests dif-
ferently in a case like Boyle. Impacts on the federal purse
are, for example, much more attenuated when a military
contractor is sued than when the United States itself is a
defendant. Moreover, the Court has previously indi-
cated that impacts on the purse may be insufficient
justification for creation of federal common law, espe-
cially when Congress has the opportunity to protect the
purse from these impacts through legislation. The most
significant federal interest in Boyle is rooted in the prin-
ciple of separation of powers and the reluctance of
courts to interfere with military decisions about appro-
priate designs for military equipment. A critical issue in
Boyle is whether that interest demands recognition of a
uniform military contractor defense as a matter of fed-
eral common law.
If the Court decides to set out a uniform defense for
military contractors in product liability suits, it must
resolve a variety of issues. Boyle argues that a military
contractor's liability should be limited only when the
government accepts allegedly defective equipment with
knowledge of the specific risks presented by the equip-
ment's design. Liability would be limited only when a
judgment of liability would involve the judiciary in sec-
ond-guessing a military decision. UTC/Sikorsky, on the
other hand, argues that the military contractor defense
should be more broadly formulated.
The scope of the defense that is recognized will de-
pend on the Court's view of the relationship of the
United States to its military contractors; whether con-
tractor liability will facilitate or interfere with a construc-
tive relationship; whether military equipment differs
from and ought to be judged by different standards
than those applied to ordinary consumer goods and
whether a requirement that contractors warn the gov-
ernment about specific product risks will engage the
judiciary in resolving complicated issues of' causation
and in second-guessing military decisions. The Court
must also evaluate whether liability will delay acquisition
and production of military equipment because of waste-
ful testing; the impact of various formulations of the
defense on the federal purse, insurance rates, contract
prices and incentives for safety; and whether military
contractors, extensively regulated tinder government
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procurement policies, should be subjected to liability
principles developed for ordinary market settings.
A simple list of these issues gives some indication of
why the Court might hesitate to attempt to formulate a
military contractor defense for product liability suits.
Resolving the issues will engage the Court in factual and
policy debates that are familiar to legislatures but which
the Court may view as foreign to its constitutional role.
ARGUMENTS
For Delbert Boyle (Counsel of Record, Louis S. Franecke, 221
Pine Street, Suite 600, San Francisco, CA 94104; telephone
(415) 391-1560)
1. The military contractor defense should be available
only when the United States has accepted military
equipment knowing of the specific design features
that risk injury. Only under those circumstances do
separation of powers principlesjustify the defense.
2. Even if the military contractor defense adopted by
the court of appeals is a correct formulation of the
defense, the case should be remanded to the district
court for a new trial.
For United Technologies Corporation (Counsel of Record,
Issue No. 3
Lewis T. Booker, 707 E. Main Street, P. 0. Box 1535, Rich-
mond, VA 23212; telephone (804) 788-8200)
1. The military contractor defense should relieve a manu-
facturer of tort liability if the United States estab-
lished or approved reasonably precise specifications
for the equipment, the equipment conformed to the
specifications and the supplier warned the United
States about dangers involved in using the equipment
that were known to the supplier but not to the United
States.
2. The Supreme Court should not interfere with a court
of appeals' determination regarding sufficiency of
evidence.
AMICUS BRIEFS
In Support of Delbert Boyle
Association of Trial Lawyers of America; Joan S.
Tozer (with other family members, litigants in a similar
case now pending before the Court)
In Support of United Technologies Corporation
The United States; Chamber of Commerce of the
United States; Defense Research Institute, Inc.; Bell
Helicopter Textron, Inc.
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